

Italian Bishops and Warfare during the Investiture Contest: The Case of Parma

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According to the traditional narrative, a fundamental change in the military role of the bishops of Italy occurred during the Investiture Contest, the conflict between Pope and Emperor which dominated Italian and German politics in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. Before this conflict, the bishops were the dominant force in Italy and formed the backbone of Imperial political, economic and military power in the region.¹ In this way, the Italian bishops performed a very similar function to their counterparts north of the Alps.² Authors including Johnson have highlighted the similarities of Ottonian strategies regarding the bishops in Germany and those in Italy.³ However, unlike the members of the German episcopate, many of the Italian prelates lost most of their secular roles over the course of the Investiture Contest, as bishops selected and empowered by the emperor were replaced by

¹ Pietro Rasi, *'Exercitus Italicus' e milizie cittadine nell'alto medioevo* (Padua, 1937); Gina Fasoli, "Castelli e signorie rurali," in *Agricoltura e mondo rurale in occidente nell'alto medioevo*, Settimane di studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'alto medioevo 13 (Spoleto, 1966), pp. 531–67; John Beeler, *Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200* (Ithaca, 1971), pp. 195 and 220; Benjamin Arnold, "German Bishops and Their Military Retinues in the Medieval Empire," *German History* 7, no. 2 (1989), p. 183.

² Friedrich Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 1971). Leopold Auer, 'Der Kriegsdienst des Klerus unter den sächsischen Kaisern', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 79 (1971), pp. 316-407, 80 (1972), pp. 48-70. Reuter, Timothy, 'Episcopa cum sua militia: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early Staufer Era', in *Warriors and Churchmen in the high Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Karl Leyser*, ed. Timothy Reuter (London, 1992), 79-94. Jan-Peter Stöckel, 'Reichsbischöfe und Reichsheerfahrt unter Friedrich I. Barbarossa', in *Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossa. Landesausbau - Aspekte seiner Politik - Wirkung*, ed. Bernhard Töpfer, Evamaria Engel (Weimar, 1994), pp. 63-79.

³ Edgar Nathaniel Johnson, *The secular activities of the German episcopate, 919-1024* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1932), pp. 147-8. Regarding the unique or generic nature of the Imperial Church within the kingdoms of Europe see: Timothy Reuter, 'The "imperial church system" of the Ottonian and Salian rulers: A reconsideration', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 33 (1982), pp. 347-374; Hartmut Hoffman, 'Der König und seine Bischöfe in Frankreich und im Deutschen Reich 963-1060', in *Bischof Burchard von Worms 1000-1025*, ed. Willifred Hartmann, (Michigan, 2000), pp. 79-127.

bishops installed by the Gregorian papacy.⁴ These powers were appropriated by the proto-communes and, in a few cases, the local nobility.⁵ Where the bishops remained influential, they did so primarily through their control of the sacraments and the leverage this provided over their flock.⁶ The changing role of the bishops is ascribed to the loss of their connection to the emperor, the rise of the communes and, above all, the emergence of a new ideology regarding the secular and military role of the bishops. This article will use a case study of the bishops of Parma before, during and after the Investiture Contest to challenge this perception. I will argue that the formal military role of the bishops of Italy was being eroded before Gregorian bishops were installed, and that there is considerable evidence that the Gregorian bishops continued to fulfil the same military roles as their imperial predecessors. The perception of Gregorian bishops as peaceful men of God who relinquished their military responsibilities is based on the ideological narrative set out by Gregorian polemicists and, more generally, on the political goals of the authors of the sources which detailed military conflict in this period.

“One of the most important intellectual problems which the Church faced in the Middle Ages was to reconcile warfare with the Christian message.”⁷ Graham A. Loud’s statement regarding the relationship between the Papacy and the Normans arriving in the South of Italy in the late eleventh century is even more applicable in relation to the other end of the peninsula. The conflict with the emperor compelled the Gregorian papacy to incorporate armed force as an ideologically valid resource of the Church.⁸ Several authors attempted to justify papal endorsement of military action against the emperor: Gregory VII

⁴ Reinhold Schumann, *Authority and the Commune, Parma 833-1133* (Parma, 1973), p. 165; Roberto Celli, “Il principio del potere popolare nella genesi dei comuni italiani,” in *Poteri assemblee autonomie: Il lungo cammino verso la sovranità popolare: Miscellanea in memoria di Roberto Celli* (Udine, 1989), pp. 45–49; Mary Stroll, *Popes and Antipopes: The Politics of Eleventh Century Church Reform*, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions 159 (Leiden, 2012), p. 7.

⁵ Celli, “Il principio del potere popolare,” p. 49.

⁶ John Kenneth Hyde, *Society and Politics in Medieval Italy: The Evolution of Civil Life, 1000-1350* (London, 1973), p. 58; Maureen C. Miller, *The Bishop’s Palace: Architecture and Authority in Medieval Italy*, Conjunctions of Religion & Power in the Medieval Past (Ithaca, NY, 2000), p. 5.

⁷ Graham A. Loud, “The Church, Warfare and Military Obligation in Norman Italy,” *Studies in Church History* 20 (1983), 31.

⁸ Ian S Robinson, “Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ,” *History* 58, no. 193 (1973), 169–92; Edith Pásztor, “Lotta per le investiture e ‘ius belli’: la posizione di Anselmo di Luca,” in *Sant’Anselmo, Mantova e la lotta per le Investiture. Atti del Convegno Internazi*, ed. Paolo Golinelli, Il mondo medievale (Bologna, 1987), p. 376.

developed the concept of the *fideles sancti Petri* as warriors in the service of the Church;⁹ John of Mantua wrote defending the ideological foundation for military action in order to reconcile heretics;¹⁰ Anselm of Lucca went further, arguing that not only was coercive action of this sort acceptable, it was a duty of the Church.¹¹ Against this, Imperial polemicists presented the military actions of the Gregorian popes and their supporters as illegal and immoral: A lost letter of the Antipope Guibert of Ravenna condemned those within the Church who encouraged military resistance against the Emperor.¹²

This ideological conflict did not emerge in a vacuum. As Friedrich Prinz and Maureen C. Miller have demonstrated there was a fundamental shift in episcopal ideology during the tenth century in Europe as a whole: while authors of the ninth and early tenth centuries saw no taboo in bishops and abbots participating in warfare, their counterparts in the later tenth century increasingly tended to portray “good” clergymen avoiding all forms of violence.¹³ Although prohibitions against clerical violence had been promulgated since the councils of Toledo and Chalcedon in the fifth century,¹⁴ these restrictions were generally ignored.¹⁵ This was largely a consequence of the political and military realities of the ninth and tenth centuries: conflict with the Vikings, Saracens and Magyars meant that the bishop’s military role was often vital in order to defend his flock.¹⁶ It was only under the Ottonians, when these external threats abated, that the involvement of clergy in warfare was discussed more critically and an ideological shift began.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the bishops and abbots of the Empire retained important secular and military positions throughout the Ottonian and Salian periods. Bishops and abbots frequently undertook military roles; mustering and leading their *militia*

⁹ Karl Leyser, *Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and beyond*, ed. Timothy Reuter (London, 1994), pp. 13–14; Herbert E. J. Cowdrey, *Pope Gregory VII, 1073–1085* (Oxford, 1998), p. 564.

¹⁰ Patrick Healy, “‘Merito nominetur virago’: Matilda of Tuscany in the Polemics of the Investiture Contest,” in *Victims or Viragos?*, ed. Christine Meek and Catherine Lawless, *Studies on Medieval and Early Modern Women* 4 (Dublin, 2005), p. 51.

¹¹ Kathleen G. Cushing, *Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution: The Canonistic Work of Anselm of Lucca*, *Oxford Historical Monographs* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 128–29.

¹² Healy, “‘Merito nominetur virago,’” pp. 51–52.

¹³ Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter*, pp. 171–72; Maureen C. Miller, “Masculinity, Reform, and Clerical Culture: Narratives of Episcopal Holiness in the Gregorian Era,” *Church History* 72 (2003), 25–52.

¹⁴ Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (New York, NY, 1984), pp. 268–69.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 269–70.

¹⁶ Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 115–46, esp. 145–46; Miller, “Masculinity, Reform, and Clerical Culture,” p. 27.

¹⁷ Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 171–72.

ecclesiae.¹⁸ The reality of the secular roles and wealth of the bishops meant that the ideal of clerical absence from violence and warfare could not be realised.¹⁹

The Investiture Contest brought this issue to a new head. The ideology embraced by many supporters of the Gregorian papacy and codified by Anselm of Lucca sought to empower the Church as the ultimate source for coercive action: kings and nobles were to be imbued with this authority by the Church (and only by the Church) in order to protect itself and its interests.²⁰ However, Anselm and many others within the Gregorian movement argued that bishops and other clergy should remain aloof from the violence itself.²¹ This stands in stark contrast to the secular and military duties traditionally held by the Italian bishops. The works of Anselm and the other Gregorian canonists, alongside the general shift in the image of the ideal bishop, influenced subsequent depictions of the bishops of the Investiture Contest. Several Gregorian bishops of this period, such as Bernard degli Uberti of Parma and Anselm himself, were made saints in the centuries after the Investiture Contest. The *vitae* of these figures naturally portrays them embracing saintly virtues, including abstention from violence. Other factors influenced the portrayal of both the imperial and Gregorian bishops of the Italian cities in the sources of their time. This is not always considered in the discussion of the secular and military roles of these bishops. Rather, there remains a tendency to view imperial bishops as generals and Gregorian bishops as pacifists.

Parma is a useful case study as the city's bishops are normally presented undergoing a sharp transition from militarily active, unequivocal supporters of the emperor to dutiful followers of the Gregorian papacy who abhorred violence. Cadalus served as Antipope Honorius II in opposition to Alexander II, the predecessor and close colleague of Gregory VII. Cadalus' successors Everard and Guido were involved in military campaigns against the Gregorian papacy and under their leadership Parma remained a loyal imperial bastion. However, following the death of Guido, Bernard degli Uberti was installed in Parma in 1104 with the support of Paschal II and Matilda of Canossa (traditionally the closest Italian secular

¹⁸ Beeler, *Warfare in Europe*, p. 220; Prinz, *Klerus und Krieg*, pp. 166–67.

¹⁹ Loud, "The Church, Warfare and Military Obligation," p. 31.

²⁰ Cushing, *Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution*, p. 132.

²¹ Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade* (Princeton, NJ, 1977), p. 57; Cushing, *Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution*, p. 133.

ally of the Gregorian papacy). While there was some dissent against Bernard, his episcopate is generally seen as the period in which Parma moved from an imperial orbit into a papal one and the point at which the military functions of the bishop were transferred to the commune.²² This narrative is much more simple than that of many other Italian cities. For example, the citizens of Mantua expelled their Gregorian bishop and accepted an imperial replacement when they allied themselves with the emperor in 1091; the citizens eventually accepted another Gregorian bishop in 1114. Because of this relative simplicity of narrative, the case of Parma allows a thorough consideration of the changes to the bishop's role on the basis of a clear transition of power.

I will make two central points:

1) The military role of the bishops of Parma became less formalised over the course of the Investiture Contest, but there was always an expectation that they would support military activity if necessary.

2) There is evidence that all of the bishops of Parma, both imperial and Gregorian, during this period were involved in warfare. However, their precise role is ambiguous. This will not resolve the issue of Italian bishops and warfare during the Investiture Contest but it will demonstrate that several elements of the traditional narrative are in need of revision.

The military rights and responsibilities of bishop of Parma

During the centuries between the Carolingian conquest of Italy and the Investiture Contest the bishops of Parma obtained a series of secular rights and responsibilities. These were obtained primarily through royal and imperial grants but also came from other sources including purchases, donations from secular figures and grants from the papacy. The full evolution of these rights is charted by several authors,²³ but the military aspects of these powers has not been considered in any depth. The charters which detail these rights

²² Gina Fasoli, "La realtà cittadina nei territori canossiani," in *Studi matildici, Atti e Memorie del III Convegno di Studi matildici (Reggio Emilia, 7-9 ottobre 1977)* (Modena, 1978), pp. 64–65; Paolo Golinelli, "L'Italia dopo la lotta per le investiture: la questione dell'eredità matildica," *Studi Medievali* 42, no. 2 (2001), 516; David J Hay, *The Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa, 1046-1115* (Manchester, 2010), p. 171.

²³ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, pp. 77–90; Gerhard Schwartz, *Die Besetzung Der Bistümer Reichsitaliens: Unter Den Sächsischen Und Salischen Kaisern Mit Den Listen Der Bischöfe 951-1122* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1913, repr. Spoleto, 1993), pp. 185–88.

demonstrate the theoretical role of the bishop in warfare and expectations placed on them by the donors of the documents.

The earliest extant royal or imperial charter granted to the bishops of Parma was produced on 11 May 879 in Otting in Bavaria on behalf of Carloman, king of Bavaria and Italy. This document included a number of minor rights and territorial possessions, but is most notable for its confirmation of the bishop's control over the public rights and tolls within the city of Parma as bounded by the walls ("We [Carloman] confirm the aforementioned Guibod and his church with all of the public rights and tolls and the districtus of this city and enclosed within the circuit of the walls").²⁴ These rights were confirmed by several subsequent kings and emperors and, in a charter of Otto I produced on 13 March 962 in Lucca, these rights were extended to encompass an area three miles around the city ("We [Otto I] transfer and delegate the walls of the city and the districtus and the tolls and all public functions held within the city and outside in all regions within three miles of the city").²⁵ These documents provided the bishop with the public rights normally reserved to the king or his designated executors (typically the counts). It is not unreasonable to assume that this included military rights: none of the charters refer to exemptions from military service. At the very least, the bishop required coercive powers to uphold his rights of jurisdiction (*districtum*).

The repeated references to the walls of Parma suggests a specific military function for the bishops of this city from at least the late Carolingian period, namely the upkeep and control of the city's defences. This is expressed most clearly in the charter produced by the court of Otto I where the emperor explicitly assigned the walls of the city to the bishop ("transfundimus atque delegamus murum ipsius civitatis").²⁶ The bishop of Parma was unambiguously placed in control of the most basic and most symbolic of the city's defensive measures. This grant is certainly connected to the episcopal rights over tolls (*telonium*) as the

²⁴ "... confirmamus predicto Uuibodo et prelibate ecclesie sue omne ius publicum et toloneum atque districtum eiusdem civitatis et ambitum murorum in circuitu": *Die Urkunden Karlmanns*, ed. Paul Fridolin Kehr, MGH Diplomatum Karolinorum 1 (Berlin, 1934), no. 24, p. 321.

²⁵ "... transfundimus atque delegamus murum ipsius civitatis et districtum et telonium et omnem publicam functionem tam infra civitatem quam extra ex omni parte civitatis infra tria milliaria": *Die Urkunden Otto I*, ed. Theodor Sickel, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 1 (Hannover, 1884), no. 239, p. 333.

²⁶ Ibid.

walls and gates of the city provided the means to control entry and exit of goods. However, ultimately the walls were a military structure.

That control of the walls was listed first amongst the bishop's rights further underlines the importance of these powers to their role and it is likely that this was Otto's intent in producing the charter. In 961 Otto had descended into Italy in support of Pope John XII against the invasion of the papal territories by Berengar of Ivrea. By Christmas of 961 Otto was in control of Pavia and Berengar's supporters had deserted him. On 2 February 962 Otto was crowned emperor in Rome. The 962 charter to the bishop of Parma was produced while Otto was returning north to confront Berengar who was sheltering at San Leo. The document was designed in part as a statement of Otto's authority and right to intervene in Italy, but also as a means to strengthen the bishop of Parma and provide a potential ally in the region.

Under Conrad II the bishops of Parma received the greatest confirmation of their secular powers. In a document issued in Augsburg on 15 February 1036 Conrad granted Bishop Hugh (1027-1040) control of the *comitatus* within the diocese of Parma.²⁷ This was a substantial extension of the bishop's existing rights and essentially gave him the role of the count of Parma. This included political, judicial and economic rights and responsibilities as well as the military authority necessary to uphold these rights and to provide support for the emperor.²⁸

The control of the *comitatus* was confirmed on Hugh's successor Cadalus (1045-1072) by the emperor Henry III in a charter produced on 1 May 1047 in Mantua.²⁹ Cadalus is the last bishop for whom we have a charter which formally sets out the bishop's right to the *comitatus*. However, an imperial charter to the cathedral chapter of Parma created on 3rd December 1081 refers to Everard (1074-1085) as bishop and head of the episcopal see and county (*comitatus*) of Parma.³⁰ The use of this phrase, and the reference to the *comitatus* in particular, is unique amongst imperial descriptions of the bishop of Parma. Its use here was

²⁷ *Die Urkunden Konrads II*, ed. Harry Bresslau, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 4 (Hannover, 1909), no. 226, pp. 140-1.

²⁸ Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, p. 40.

²⁹ *Die Urkunden Heinrichs III*, ed. Harry Bresslau, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 5 (Berlin, 1931), no. 197, p. 385-6.

³⁰ "Eurardus episcopus et preses ipsius Parmensis episcopii et comitatus": *Die Urkunden Heinrichs IV*, ed. Harry Bresslau, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 6 (Hannover, 1909), no. 340, p. 449.

designed to underline Everard's political and military authority and responsibilities. The document emphasised the three-way relationship between the emperor, the bishop of Parma and his cathedral chapter connecting the rights of the cathedral to those of the bishop. The document was issued in Parma itself when Henry and the imperial host was travelling south to Rome to confront Gregory VII; its timing allowed Henry to ensure the loyalty of the cathedral chapter in this conflict and to ensure that this body would not challenge the bishop's ability to participate in his campaign.

After Everard, there is no indication that subsequent bishops of Parma enjoyed control over the *comitatus*. No charters survive which confirm these rights on any subsequent bishop and none of Everard's successors are given a title incorporating the *comitatus*. At the same time, counts of Parma appear more frequently in the charter record. The office of count never ceased to exist in Parma but after the 1036 grant to Hugh, his rights over the *comitatus* were restricted to the territory within the county of Parma which lay outside the diocese of Parma: namely Bismantova, a small section of territory to the east of the county.³¹ For much of the eleventh century the power of the counts was negligible in most of the county. However, towards the end of the eleventh century the counts of Parma began to operate outside these marginal areas. Most notably on 29 June 1093 Count Ubert issued a charter to the abbey of San Giovanni, an institution within the walls of Parma, while holding court just outside the city.³² The *comitatus* and its associated roles were quite possibly being usurped by the counts.

This is not to say that Guido and subsequent bishops of Parma were completely removed from their secular and military roles and responsibilities. On 15 June 1114 Matilda of Canossa granted Bernard degli Uberti (1104-1133) control of the town of Montecchio Emilia.³³ This strategically important location dominated a key river crossing between Parma and Reggio and suggests an ongoing military role for the bishop of Parma. Another Bernard, bishop of Parma (1167?-after 1186) under Frederick I, received several imperial grants concerning landholdings. These included, in a charter issued on 11 February 1186, control over

³¹ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, p. 45.

³² Giovanni Drei, *Le Carte Degli Archivi Parmensi Del Secoli X-XI*, 3 vols (Parma, 1924-50), 2:156.

³³ *Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien*, ed. Elke Goez and Werner Goez, MGH Laienfürsten- und Dynastenerkunden der Kaiserzeit 2 (Hannover, 1998), no. 132, pp. 338-40.

the *castrum* at Regnano to the south of Reggio.³⁴ Although *castrum* generally referred to holdings with primarily political or economic functions, these sites were almost universally connected to military matters.³⁵ This charter to the later Bernard demonstrates that in the late twelfth century the emperor expected the bishop of Parma to be able to fulfil a military role. While it does appear that Guido and his successors lost a large part of their formal military powers, it is evident that they were not intended to be entirely removed from military activity.

This account is somewhat at odds with the traditional narrative, which places Bernard's episcopate as the period in which the bishops of Parma relinquished their military role. Certainly, there is no evidence that Bernard degli Uberti or Lanfranc were confirmed in their control of the *comitatus* or rights over the city and its walls. However, there is also no evidence that the pro-imperial bishops Guido, Aicard (c. 1160-1167) or Bernard were confirmed in these rights. Furthermore, the only indication that Everard held these rights appears in a very ambiguous and cursory reference. It seems that the formal military role of the bishops of Parma reached its zenith under Hugh and Cadalus but was then swiftly eroded under Everard and his successors. Bernard degli Uberti could not have relinquished these powers as they were no longer his to give away. At the same time, it is evident that the bishops who succeeded Everard retained some lesser, but nonetheless formalised, military rights and responsibilities.

The bishops of Parma at war

While the charter record provides a record of the theoretical formal military rights of the bishops of Parma, the actual extent of the involvement of these bishops in military activity is harder to gauge. Both the charter record and the narrative sources for these bishops demonstrate that Cadalus, Everard, Guido and Bernard degli Uberti were all involved in military activity to some extent. However, while the charter record can be used to

³⁴ *Die Urkunden Friedrichs I*, ed. Friedrich Appelt, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 10 (Hannover, 1975), no. 930, pp. 197-8.

³⁵ Fabio Cusin, "Per la Storia del Castello Medioevale," *Revista Storica Italiana* 4 (1939), 491; Edward Coleman, "Incastellamento on the Po Plain: Cremona and Its Territory in the Tenth Century," *Reading Medieval Studies* 17 (1991), 78-86.

demonstrate the presence of these bishops alongside armies, they do not illuminate the role of the bishops within these armies. In contrast, although the narrative sources occasionally give explicit or implicit accounts of the position of the military position of the bishops, these accounts are inevitably influenced by the rhetorical and political goals of their authors.

The charter record provides some indication of the movements of the bishops of Parma in the late eleventh century and demonstrates that they often appeared in the Imperial entourage during periods of warfare. This does not prove that the bishops were involved in the fighting, but it does strongly suggest that they were in its vicinity and provided troops and support. Cadalus was present in the court of Henry III during his campaign against Godfrey the Bearded in Italy in 1055. His presence is noted in an imperial court case resolved in Zurich in February 1054 in favour of Hubald, bishop of Cremona, against Adelheid, Abbess of San Maria Theodota in Pavia.³⁶ Cadalus appeared again at another court case in Borgo San Genesio near Pisa on 15 June 1055 resolved in favour of Abbot Landulf of San Prospero in Reggio against one Margrave Azzo.³⁷ Guido can likewise be connected to Henry's campaign of 1090 to 1097 in Lombardy and Emilia. He appears as a witness to an imperial charter produced in Botticino in the county of Brescia in 1091.³⁸ It is probable that Guido remained with Henry's forces throughout the rest of the emperor's expedition: no charters or other sources survive indicating Guido's location until his presence at the synod held in Vercelli by the antipope, Guibert of Ravenna in 1098.³⁹

There is a corresponding indication that the Gregorian bishops of Parma Bernard degli Uberti and Lanfranc travelled with military forces, although not necessarily those of the emperor. Bernard was a staunch supporter of the reform movement and in fact was briefly a prisoner of the emperor Henry V in 1111.⁴⁰ As a result, it is unsurprising that Bernard was not active within the imperial host. However, Bernard appeared frequently in Matilda's charters until her death in 1115.⁴¹ Matilda was not active in the conflict between Henry V and Paschal

³⁶ *Die Urkunden Heinrichs III*, ed. Bresslau, no. 318, pp. 436-8.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 348, p. 475.

³⁸ *Die Urkunden Heinrichs IV*, ed. Bresslau, no. 419, pp. 558-9.

³⁹ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, 330.

⁴⁰ Glauco Maria Cantarella, *Pasquale II e il suo tempo*, *Nuovo Medioevo* 54 (Napoli, 1997), p. 104.

⁴¹ *Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien*, ed. Goetz and Goetz, no. 97, 114, 115, 132, 134, pp. 266-9, 302-4, 304-6, 338-40, 342-4.

II but was involved in a series of minor conflicts with the cities within her domain, many of which had rebelled against her rule during the earlier phases of the Investiture Contest. Most notably, Mantua remained in rebellion from 1091 until October 1114 when the city reconciled with Matilda and accepted her ally Manfred as bishop (1109/1114-1147).⁴² Bernard's appearances at Matilda's court frequently coincided with the more active periods in her conflicts with her cities. For example, in 1114, the final year of Matilda's dispute with Mantua, Bernard was in Montebarrazzone near Ferrara on 15 June 1114 where Matilda granted him the town of Montecchio Emilia.⁴³ He appeared again on 23 October of that year in Bondeno in the county of Mantua as a witness to Matilda's grant to the monastery of Nonantola.⁴⁴ It is therefore very likely that Bernard was present in Matilda's entourage when the Mantua rebellion ended. He may well have contributed troops to this end. Bernard's successor, Lanfranc (1133-c.1160), was another reformer and appeared twice within the charters of Lothar III, an emperor strongly allied with the Gregorian movement, while the emperor was preparing his campaign against the Normans of Sicily in 1136. Lanfranc was a witness to both the treaty with Venice produced on 3 October 1136 and a grant of lands to Venice issued later that month.⁴⁵ It is probable that Lanfranc, with a contingent of troops from Parma, travelled into southern Italy with Lothar in much the same way as Cadalus and Guido had travelled with the imperial host.

The appearance of the imperial bishops alongside armed forces is entirely in keeping with the typical narrative. However, the similar appearances made by the Gregorian bishops run counter to this narrative. Bernard and Lanfranc, as Gregorian bishops, were supposedly absent from military activities, but the charter record demonstrates that they were present within important campaigns in exactly the same manner as their imperial counterparts. There is no evidence within these charters that their involvement in these campaigns differed from that of the imperial bishops in earlier military adventures.

⁴² Dorothy F. Glass, *The Sculpture of Reform in North Italy, Ca. 1095-1130: History and Patronage of Romanesque Façades* (Farnham, 2010), p. 45.

⁴³ *Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien*, ed. Goez and Goez, no. 132, p. 338-40.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 134, p. 342-4.

⁴⁵ *Die Urkunden Lothar III und Kaiserin Richenza*, ed. Emil von Ottenthal and Hans Hirsch, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 8 (Berlin, 1927), no. 97, 100, pp. 151-6, 160-2.

The narrative sources provide some further details of the military activities of the bishops of Parma. As Antipope, Cadalus led two expeditions to Rome. Everard's capture at the battle of Sorbara on 2 July 1084 is reported by all four of the contemporary sources for the battle. Landulf Junior records the capture of a group of Paterne priests by Guido's men in 1097.

The most detailed account of Cadalus' expeditions against Rome is provided by Bonizo of Sutri in his *Liber ad amicum*. Bonizo wrote in 1085 or 1086 in the entourage of Matilda of Canossa.⁴⁶ The central goal of his work was to justify military action against Christians in defence of the Church with the more specific aim of ensuring Matilda of Canossa continued to support the Gregorian papacy.⁴⁷ Bonizo presents Cadalus entering Lombardy (after his election in Basel) surrounded by soldiers and accompanied by the bishops of Lombardy: "[Cadalus] invaded Lombardy surrounded by many soldiers, having the stubborn bishops of Lombardy in his company".⁴⁸ Here Cadalus is implied to be the leader of his forces. When Cadalus eventually arrived at Rome, Bonizo reports that he established his camp in the field of Nero (to the north of the city) and emerged victorious in the ensuing battle: "Meanwhile that man [Cadalus], odious to God, made camp in the field of Nero and, when battle was undertaken, by the secret judgement of God, he appeared to be the victor."⁴⁹ Again, Bonizo implied that Cadalus played a role of leadership within his forces. Cadalus is also found at the head of his troops during his second expedition to Rome in 1063. He "came into the Leonine city at night and invaded the church of St Peter".⁵⁰ He "retreated to the castle Sant'Angelo where he defended himself and he was besieged there for two years".⁵¹ Bonizo's insistent use of the third person singular underlines his portrayal of Cadalus playing a personal and leading role in these campaigns and battles. Even though he mentions several other individuals

⁴⁶ Eugenio Riversi, *La memoria di Canossa: saggi di contestualizzazione della Vita Mathildis di Donizone*, Studi medioevali, nuova ser., 2 (Pisa 2013), p. 66.

⁴⁷ Ludovico Gatto, "Matilde di Canossa nel 'Liber ad Amicum' di Bonizone da Sutri," in *Studi matildici: Atti e Memorie del II Convegno di Studi matildici (Reggio Emilia, 1-3 maggio 1970)* (Modena, 1971), pp. 307–25.

⁴⁸ "Qui [Cadalus] stipatus multis militibus intravit Longobardiam, habens secum in comitatu cervicosos episcopos Longobardie." Bonizo of Sutri, *Liber ad amicum*, ed. Ernst Dümmler, Lothar von Heinemann, and Friedrich Thaner, MGH Libelli de lite imperatorum et pontificum 1 (Hannover, 1891), p. 595.

⁴⁹ "Interea Deo odibilis [Cadalus] ille in prato Neronis castra metatus est, occultoque Dei iudicio bello commisso victor apparuit." Ibid.

⁵⁰ "... noctu civitatem Leonianam intravit et ecclesiam sancti Petri invadit." Ibid.

⁵¹ "castrum Sancti Angeli intravit ibique se tutatus est, quo in eodem castro per duos annos obsessus" Ibid.

involved in Cadalus campaigns, including the bishops of Lombardy but also secular leaders such as Cencius Stephani, Bonizo made Cadalus the embodiment of the forces attacking Rome. This served two functions. Firstly, it downplayed the involvement of the Lombard bishops in this conflict. Many of these bishops had reconciled with the papal see by the time Bonizo was writing. Secondly, emphasising Cadalus as the sole force involved in these attacks complimented Bonizo's general depiction of the antipope. Bonizo explicitly identifies Cadalus with the evil which will break forth out of the north onto all the inhabitants of the land as described in Jeremiah 1:14: "He came to Rome from the north, from where, according to Jeremiah, evil shall spread over all the inhabitants of the land."⁵² Cadalus almost certainly did play an important role in these attacks on Rome: it would be uniquely unusual for a bishop of his standing and power not to at least supply troops. However, Bonizo's account over-emphasises this role in order to support the author's political and rhetorical goals.

The narrative sources are virtually silent with regards to Everard. Bonizo mentions that he was elected to the bishopric of Parma after the death of Cadalus and that he was a *clericus* from Cologne.⁵³ Beyond this, the only time Everard is mentioned is in relation to the battle of Sorbara on 2 July 1084. Four contemporary authors provide accounts of this battle of Sorbara and Everard's involvement: an anonymous priest of Lucca, in his *Vita Anselmi Episcopi Lucensis*;⁵⁴ Bernold of St. Blasien in his *Chronicon*;⁵⁵ Ranger of Lucca in his *Vita Anselmi*;⁵⁶ and Donizone of Canossa in his *Vita Mathildis Comitissae*.⁵⁷ These authors all indicate a major defeat of the imperial forces by Matilda's troops and that the bishop of Parma, Everard, was captured. This demonstrates that Everard was present at the battle and has been used to suggest that he played a key role within the imperial army.⁵⁸ However, his precise role is

⁵² "... ab aquilone veniret Romam, unde secundum Ieremiam pandetur malum super universos habitatores terre." *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 600.

⁵⁴ Pseudo Bardo, *Vita Anselmi Episcopi Lucensis*, c. 23–24, ed. Georg H. Pertz, MGH SS 12 (Hannover, 1856), pp. 20–21.

⁵⁵ Bernold of St. Blasien, *Chronicon*, ed. Georg H. Pertz, MGH SS 5 (Hannover, 1844), p. 441.

⁵⁶ Ranger of Lucca, *Vita Sancti Anselmi Lucensis episcopi*, ed. Ernst Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz, and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH SS, MGH 30.2 (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 1292–94, ll. 6546–6616.

⁵⁷ Donizone, *Vita Mathildis*, ed. Paolo Golinelli and Vito Fumagalli, Biblioteca di cultura medievale 823 (Milano, 2008), bk. 2. ch. 3, ln 304–60, pp. 148–51.

⁵⁸ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, p. 211; Tilman Struve, "Matilde di Toscana-Canossa ed Enrico IV," in *I Poteri dei Canossa, da Reggio Emilia all'Europa: atti del convegno internazionale di studi (Reggio Emilia-Carpinetti, 29-31 ottobre 1992)*, ed. Paolo Golinelli, Il mondo medievale (Bologna, 1994), pp. 440–42.

ambiguous. Most of these sources provide very few details about the battle and only Donizone gives any explicit indication of the leadership of the imperial forces. He presents the pro-imperial army as citizens of many cities, armed and mounted, under the command of the proud but skilled marchess Oberto (head of the Pallavicino family, who held extensive lands in Parma and Piacenza).⁵⁹

At this time many citizens from many cities
Took up arms at the same time, well-equipped with shields and horses,
Under command of the lofty prince, in short the prudent Oberto,
They led the bishops of Parma and Reggio.⁶⁰

Notably, Donizone has the bishops of Parma and Reggio being led by this force rather than the force being led by the bishops. By the poet's account, the pro-imperial army was under the command of a secular figure while the bishops of Parma and Reggio were cast in supporting roles.

It is possible that Matilda's forces took the pro-imperial army by surprise; a situation which could easily lead to non-combatants being caught in the fighting and captured. Eads and Hay have suggested that the battle of Sorbara may have been an ambush on the sleeping imperial camp by Matilda's forces. This certainly fits with the description of the battle provided by Donizone. The poet describes the imperial forces camped at Sorbara, which was assigned as their final battlefield, before presenting Matilda's forces attacking at dawn while the camp is still asleep, with a shout of "Peter! Protect your own!":

Sorbaria supports the camps of these men,
It assigns the places of watch by their own battlefield.
They are resting at night, eyes assuming sleep,
The second light of July having begun,
Behold! The army of Matilda suddenly arrives: "Peter!" They proclaim
"Assist your own!" The enemies, saw them and
began to rise up, the plains were stunned by such a great uproar.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, pp. 213–14.

⁶⁰ "Urbibus ex multis cives hoc tempore multi / Insimul armati, clipeis et equis falerati, / Principe cum celso, prudenti prorsus Oberto, / Ducunt Parmensem, Reginum pontificemque." Donizone, *Vita Mathildis*, bk. 2, ch. 3, ln. 338–41, p. 150.

⁶¹ Incipiunt, campi tanto strepitu stupefacti. / Sustinet istorum Sorbaria castra virorum, / In propriis campis illis tribuit loca standi. / Nocte uiescentes oculis somnum capientes, Iulius assumpta iam vero luce secunda, / Ecce repente phalanx Mathildis adest: "Petre" clamans / "Auxiliare tuis!" Inimici surgere tuti. Ibid., bk. 2, ch. 3, ln. 347–53, p. 150.

This account allows for Everard to be present at the camp with no intention of involvement in battle. He, along with the rest of the imperial forces, would have been unaware of the impending attack.

It should be noted that Donizone is the only author who presents the battle in this manner. None of the other writers go beyond mentioning a decisive victory for Matilda's forces and say nothing of the leadership of the imperial host or of a dawn ambush. Throughout his work Donizone blended history and rhetoric to achieve his narrative goals. With regards to his account of the battle of Sorbara, Donizone underlined the role of Oberto amongst the defeated imperial forces, because Oberto remained an opponent of Matilda and her ally Bernard degli Uberti in the period when Donizone was writing (1111–1115). This is most evident when Donizone states that Oberto struck a single blow before speaking as if an old woman and fleeing without honour:

The aforesaid marquis [Oberto] struck a blow,
And speaking with the voice of a grandmother, he fled without honour.⁶²

Donizone also maintained a trope throughout his work whereby Matilda and her ancestors are shown defeating their opponents through their cunning. For example: Matilda's father, Boniface, is described twice avoiding capture by Henry III by outwitting and outmanoeuvring the emperor and his forces. The use of an ambush is wholly in keeping with Donizone's use of this trope. Nevertheless, Donizone's account is compatible with that of the other authors. None of the other writers provide a leader for the expedition and the minimal casualties (only three dead within Matilda's forces) described by both the anonymous author of the *Vita Anselm* and Ranger of Lucca,⁶³ although surely an exaggeration, could easily correspond to the type of ambush described by Donizone. If nothing else, Donizone's account underlines the expectation that an imperial army would be led by a secular figure even if it comprised troops supplied by bishops. Guido's involvement in military matters is recorded only by the *Historia Mediolanensis* of Landulf Junior. Landulf reports that the Paterene priests Liprand, Arnald and Siro were captured by Guido's men in 1097: "But yet, on the second day of his journey with

⁶² Marcio predictus [Oberto] quendam transverbat ictu, / Et quasivoce loquens nonnae, sine fugit honore. Ibid., pp. 356–57.

⁶³ Pseudo Bardo, *Vita Anselmi*, c. 24, ed. Pertz, pp. 20-1; Ranger of Lucca, *Vita Sancti Anselmi Lucensis episcopi*, ed. Sackur, Schwartz and Schmeidler, p. 1293, ll. 6558–59.

the priest Arnald, teacher of the school of Milan, and Siro, priest of the consecrated church of Saint Mary at Podoni, they were captured by the men of the bishop of Parma.”⁶⁴ Landulf gives no indication of Guido’s personal involvement in this action; in fact Guido is not mentioned by name. It is quite possible that the *homines Parmensis episcopi* acted without instruction from Guido—as indicated above, there is no evidence that he ever set foot in Parma. In any event, Landulf’s account removes Guido from personal military involvement.

Cadalus, Everard and Guido are all mentioned in connection to violent activity during their episcopates. To a certain extent this corresponds to the traditional narrative of imperial bishops leading armies on behalf of the emperor. However, the military role of these bishops appears to have been overstated: Bonizo’s portrayal of Cadalus leading his forces against Rome was part of a narrative device comparing Cadalus to a biblical evil; Donizone’s account of the battle of Sorbara demonstrates Everard in a supporting role despite the issues with the source; and Landulf’s account of the *homines Parmensis episcopi* in action against the Paterenes is a footnote and almost completely removes Guido from the events.

There is corresponding evidence within the narrative sources that Bernard degli Uberti was involved in similar activities. Bernard can be found directing military action against the citizens of Borgo San Donnino in 1108. This town was traditionally subservient to the bishop of Parma, but had become separated during the Investiture Contest.⁶⁵ The 1108 expedition curbed the expansion of the town’s influence but failed to return it to the episcopal jurisdiction.⁶⁶ Bernard is mentioned in connection to the conflict between Parma against Cremona and Piacenza in 1120 and against Cremona alone in 1121. In 1127 Bernard also attempted to provide military support for Lothar III against the Staufen anti-king, Conrad of Swabia. However, this endeavour was thwarted by the preference of the citizens of Parma for Conrad.

Bernard’s involvement in these conflicts has been incorrectly downplayed. For example, Schumann argues that Bernard had difficulty enforcing his secular authority as he

⁶⁴ “Verumtamen altera die faciens iter suum [Liprand] cum presbitero Arnaldo magistro scholarum Mediolanensi, et Siro sacerdote ecclesie sancte Marie Podoni, captus est ab hominibus Parmensis episcopi.” Landulf de Sacto Paulo, *Historia Mediolanensis a. 1097-1137*, c. 3, ed. Ludowicus Bethman and Philippe Jaffe, MGH SS 20 (Stuttgart, 1868), p. 22.

⁶⁵ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, pp. 214–15; Hay, *The Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa*, p. 172.

⁶⁶ Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, p. 215.

was not a vassal of the emperor and so had no legitimising source for this authority.⁶⁷ He acknowledges the references to warfare within the sources detailing Bernard's life, but argues that he adopted an auxiliary role allowing the citizens of the proto-commune in Parma to take control of military activity.⁶⁸ Bernard is portrayed embracing the ideals of just war and of the Church empowering secular powers to carry out this just war.

However, there are some fundamental issues with this portrayal. The main sources which discuss Bernard's episcopate are his three *vita*, all of which were designed by their authors to underline his piety. As a result, the authors of these sources presented Bernard behaving as the ideal priest. His involvement in military activity was therefore portrayed along the lines of Anselm's views of just war: Bernard, as the representative of the Church empowered secular forces to engage in coercive action to return those who strayed from the Orthodox path to the Catholic fold. For example, the account of the rebellion of Borgo San Donnino given by the anonymous author of the first of Bernard's *vitae* states that Bernard's greater and lesser subjects met regarding the town of Borgo San Donnino whose citizens were raging against Bernard's church. Bernard called on his subjects to return Borgo San Donnino to friendship and favour:

Accordingly, at that time, in which he was elected bishop, the great men met with the lesser subjects of the mother Church for the subjection of Borgo San Donnino, whence the citizens were indignantly raging against them [Bernard and his subjects], and they were often called upon by the priest and his legates, to return it [Borgo San Donnino] to the favour and harmony of peace.⁶⁹

The author has Bernard directing coercive action against his wayward subjects in the manner prescribed by Anselm. Moreover, this distancing of Bernard from the military coercion of the city enables the author to separate the bishop from the violence which ensued, which the author himself terms murder and outpouring of blood.⁷⁰ In a similar manner, during his account of the attack on Parma by the Piacenzans and Cremonese in 1120, Atto of Pistoia has

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 213–14.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 220–21.

⁶⁹ “Eo siquidem tempore, quo in episcopum electus est, maiores cum minoribus subiectioni matricis ecclesie obviarunt de Burgo sancti Donini, unde civitas contra eos furens indignabatur, et sepe vocati sunt per sacerdotem eiusque legatos, ut ad pacis concordieque gratiam remearent.” *Vita I. Bernardi Episcopi Parmensis*, ed. Ernst Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz, and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH SS, MGH 30.2 (Leipzig, 1934), c. 4, p. 1318.

⁷⁰ “Homicidiis et effusione sanguinis” Ibid.

Bernard presenting the citizens of Parma with a banner and instructing and praying that they avoid killing and the shedding of blood: "It is said he presented with holy hands a banner to the citizens for the defence of the city, instructing and praying that they restrain themselves as far as possible from murder and shedding of blood."⁷¹ Again, Bernard is portrayed directing coercive action while asking for restraint.

A secondary goal of the authors of the first two of Bernard's *vitae* was to cement the fledgling loyalty of the proto-commune in Parma to the Papal See. Both the anonymous author of the first *vita* and Atto of Pistoia wrote shortly after Bernard's death.⁷² Bernard's predecessors had maintained a strong relationship with the German emperors for a century and a half prior to his installation. As demonstrated by Bernard's incarceration when he first arrived at Parma,⁷³ many of those within the commune of Parma retained loyalties to the German crown or at least a sense of hostility towards the Gregorians. The *vitae* provided their authors with an opportunity to present the citizens of Parma working with the reforming bishop and hence to construct new loyalties. Warfare was a theme which could easily evoke this kind of comradeship: Bernard's appeal to his congregation against Borgo San Donnino described above presented the bishop and the city working in concert. The author of the first *vita* portrayed the 1130 attack on Parma by the Cremonese as a threat to both the bishop and the people of Parma. In his account of the fall of Brescello—a fortification to the north east of Parma on the River Po—by treachery to the Cremonese, the author repeatedly connects the bishop and the citizens of Parma:

And likewise, in the obstinacy of their evil, enduring, envying and attacking the bishop and his citizens, they corrupted certain men through bribery, who surrendered a very well-fortified place opposite his city, namely Brescello, where they stationed a great number of soldiers and began to scare and to harass gravely the bishop and the community of people.⁷⁴

71 "Fertur etiam sacris manibus pro defensione patriae suis civibus tribuisse Vexillum, praeciptions et deprecans quatenus se ab homicidiis et effusione sanguinis custodirent."

Atto of Pistoia, *Vita Secunda Sancti Bernardi*, ed. Ireneo Affò, *Vita di San Bernardo degli Uberti Abate gen. di Vallombrosa Cardinale di S. Chiesa e Vescovo di Parma* (Parma, 1788), p. 229.

72 Schumann, *Authority and the Commune*, p. 323.

73 Raffaele Volpini, "Bernardo degli Uberti," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, ed. Alberto Maria Ghisalberti, vol. 9 (Roma, 1967), p. 296; Hay, *The Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa*, pp. 173–74.

74 "Itemque in sue malitie pertinacia perdurantes, invidentes et persequentes episcopum eiusque civitatem fraude pretii corruerunt quosdam viros, qui eis tradiderunt locum munitissimum adversus eius civitatem, Bersilum scilicet, ubi ponentes militum multitudinem terrere et vexare dure coeperunt episcopum et civitatis populum." *Vita*

I. Bernardi Episcopi Parmensis, ed. Ernst Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz, and Bernhard Schmeidler, c. 5, pp. 1318–9.

By underlining this connection in a time of adversity, the author attempted to create an ideological spirit of cooperation between the reforming bishops and the citizens of Parma, and hence draw Parma further into the orbit of Rome.

If this rhetoric is taken into account, then we find that Bernard was involved in several military actions although his precise role remains ambiguous. Bernard certainly had to maintain the support of the proto-commune; this is evidenced by the ability of the citizens to imprison him or drive him from the city. However, the auxiliary role assigned to Bernard by the authors of the sources is probably an overstatement. Bernard appeared repeatedly in connection to warfare, he was present on campaign with Matilda and was entrusted with the control of strategically important locations. Bernard's military rights and responsibilities were not formalised to the same extent as those of Cadalus had been and Bernard was not always able to deploy troops as he wished. However, Bernard was nevertheless demonstrably active within the military.

Conclusion

A new narrative may therefore be proposed with regards to the changing military role of the bishops of Parma. Their formal military role was diminished over the course of the Investiture Contest but they nevertheless continued to take part in warfare and were expected to take part in warfare by their secular allies. The introduction of a Gregorian bishop in the form of Bernard degli Uberti did little to change this: Bernard was involved in several campaigns and the difficulties he faced in utilising his military power were the consequence of a trend which had begun long before he arrived in Parma. The authors of the sources which discuss these bishops at war give accounts according to their own ideological and rhetorical goals which often led to the distortion of the actual role of the individual bishops. The typical modern account of the military role of these bishops overlooks this and places too much emphasis on a sudden change during Bernard's episcopate. Moreover, preconceptions about the secular and military position of imperial and Gregorian bishops has led to the formation of assumptions about the bishops of Parma which are not supported by the sources.

This has important consequences for our understanding of the history of Parma in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. If the introduction of a Gregorian bishop was not the primary

causal factor in the emergence of communal power in place of episcopal authority, then other influences must be reconsidered. The lapse in formal episcopal power can be traced as far back as Everard so common trends during his episcopate and that of Guido and Bernard may provide an indication of the cause for this change. All three of these bishops were absent from their See for extended periods and this could be an important area for further research.

Parma is a relatively simple case study. Nevertheless, these observations can be usefully applied to other cities. There are numerous bishops associated with the Gregorian reform movement who held military responsibilities. Even Anselm of Lucca held castles from Matilda of Canossa.⁷⁵ The general assumption that imperial bishops in Italy were warlike and secular while their Gregorian counterparts were peaceful and sacral needs to be challenged. More generally, the arguments presented above underline the difficulties inherent in defining bishops of the Investiture Contest as “imperial” or “Gregorian”. The terminology is convenient but, as a growing number of authors point out, it is often inaccurate and misleading.⁷⁶ The Investiture Contest was not a simple two sided struggle for supremacy but a network of shifting alliances and ideologies. Reducing the bishops and other figures involved in this conflict to one dimensional supporters of one side or the other impairs our understanding of not just the military aspects of this contest, but of the contest as a whole.

⁷⁵ *Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien*, eds. Goetz and Goetz, no. 20, pp. 81-3, no. 21, pp. 83-5, 26, pp. 97-104 and no. 28, pp. 104-7.

⁷⁶ See Maureen C. Miller, “The Crisis in the Investiture Crisis Narrative,” *History Compass* 7, no. 6 (2009), 1570–76.